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The Commodity–Consumer Price
Connection: Fact or Fable?
S. Brock Blombergand Ethan S. Harris
nterest in commodity prices as indicators of con-
sumer price inﬂation has ebbed and ﬂowed with
the rise and fall in commodity prices themselves.
True to form, as commodity prices have surged in
the last two years (Chart 1), interest in their predictive
power has returned. Inﬂation hawks point to an outpour-
ing of studies in the late 1980s showing a strong empirical
connection between commodity prices and subsequent
consumer inﬂation. Indeed, the concern over commodities
has grown to the point where even two previously obscure
commodity indexes—the National Association of Purchas-
ing Managers price index (NAPM) and the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia’s prices paid index (PHIL)—have
begun to capture considerable attention among economists
and market analysts.
Is this renewed attention warranted? In this arti-
cle, we argue that none of the channels through which
commodity prices signal more generalized inﬂation are
operating as well as they did in the past: commodities have
become less important as an input to production, some of
the inﬂation signals from commodity prices may be steril-
ized by offsetting monetary policy, and commodities have
become less popular as an inﬂation hedge. We also present
evidence that the recent commodity movements are a reac-
tion to swings in dollar exchange rates rather than a signal
of generalized inﬂation pressures.
Our empirical results underscore the diminished
signaling power of commodities in the last eight years.
Drawing on data for the 1970-94 period, we examine ﬁve
major U.S. commodity indexes and three subgroups of
commodities—gold, oil, and food. We use vector autore-
gression models (VARs) to test whether commodity prices
are useful in predicting subsequent movements in both the
ﬁnished goods producer price index (PPI) and the core—
that is, nonfood and nonenergy—consumer price index
(CPI). These VAR methods allow us to isolate the predic-
tive power of commodity prices while controlling for other
determinants of inﬂation. We ﬁnd that:
• Contrary to conventional theory, there is no long-run
link between the level of commodity prices and the
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level of consumer prices, but there is a link—or coin-
tegrating relationship—between the level of commodity
prices and the rate of consumer price inﬂation.
• During the full 1970-94 sample period, all of the tra-
ditional commodity indexes have some ability to pre-
dict short-run changes in core CPI inﬂation.
However, this relationship weakens considerably
starting in the mid-1980s. The breakdown extends
beyond commodity prices: even the ﬁnished goods
PPI cannot help predict changes in core CPI inﬂation
in the recent period.
• Adding monetary variables and the dollar exchange
rate to the models helps eliminate some perverse ﬁnd-
ings, suggesting that some inﬂation signals from
commodities are being obscured by offsetting changes
in exchange rates and monetary policy.
• Commodities that are particularly sensitive to major
supply disruptions (such as food and oil) appear to
have retained more explanatory power than those
inﬂuenced primarily by input demands (industrial
materials) or those used for inﬂation hedging (gold).
Our examination of the signaling power of com-
modities begins with a review of the theoretical linkages
between commodity prices and subsequent consumer price
inﬂation.
THETORTOISE AND THEHARE ANDOTHER
COMMODITY FABLES
Most arguments for a signaling role for commodities rest
on the fact that commodity prices are set in auction or
ﬂexi-price markets and therefore can sprint ahead quickly
in response to actual or expected changes in supply or
demand. By contrast, prices of most ﬁnal goods and ser-
vices, restrained by contractual arrangements and other
frictions, respond slowly and steadily to supply and
demand pressures, only gradually gaining ground on com-
modity prices. Like the hare in Aesop’s famous fable, com-
modity prices tend to take a quick, early lead in inﬂation
cycles, but ultimately lose the race, falling in real terms.
Formal theoretical models, such as Boughton and
Branson (1991) and Fuhrer and Moore (1992), are based on
this notion of commodity behavior, building on Dorn-
busch’s (1976) classic exchange rate model. In these mod-
els, commodities are assets whose price “jumps” to
equilibrate the money and goods markets. Thus, a surge in
aggregate demand (for example, an unexpected increase in
the money supply) causes commodity prices to shoot
upward while ﬁnal goods prices respond only with a lag.1
The empirical literature on commodities expands
on this simple theoretical framework and presents three
different accounts of the linkages between commodity
prices and broad inﬂation. These accounts—or commodity
“fables”—explain why commodity prices could be a useful
leading indicator of inﬂation.
First, as illustrated by the tortoise-and-hare fable,
commodity prices may give early warning signals of an
inﬂationary surge in aggregate demand. Higher demand
for ﬁnal goods increases the demand for commodity inputs
and, even though the inﬂation impetus may start in ﬁnal
goods markets, the ﬁrst visible increase in prices may be in
the ﬂexi-price commodity markets.2 Because commodities
are widely traded internationally, this aggregate demand
signal would most likely occur when strong domestic
Recent Commodity Price Movements
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Note:  Chart shows the price movements tracked by five major commodity
indexes. PHIL is the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s prices paid index;
NAPM, the National Association of Purchasing Managers price index; JOC,
the Journal of Commerce index; CRB, the Commodity Research Bureau index;
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demand is not offset by weak foreign demand. Indeed, in
empirical models, commodity prices are often modeled as a
function of global economic activity. These demand-
induced commodity price run-ups presumably will be con-
centrated in industrial materials.
Second, commodity prices and broad inﬂation may
be directly linked because commodities are an important
input into production, representing about one-tenth of the
value of output in the United States. Thus, all else being
equal, an increase in commodity prices should eventually
be passed through to ﬁnal goods prices. Historically, large
direct input price effects have tended to be concentrated in
food and energy commodities.
The third linkage between commodity prices and
future inﬂation stems from the ﬁrst two. Because commod-
ity prices respond quickly to general inﬂation pressures,
investors may see them as a useful inﬂation hedge. This
perception tends to be self-fulﬁlling: the more that com-
modities are seen as an effective hedge, the more likely
investors are to turn to them in anticipation of inﬂation.
Traditionally, precious metals have been singled out as the
most convenient commodities for hedging inﬂation.
VAR LITERATURE
These three fables motivate empirical studies of the com-
modity–consumer price connection. Most studies, how-
ever, avoid the complications of a formal structural model
and instead use VAR models to test for a positive correla-
tion between commodity prices and subsequent consumer
price inﬂation. The VAR methodology assumes that each
variable can be best explained by using past values of both
itself and all other relevant variables. Using this approach,
a very active literature in the late 1980s established the
following:3
• Although commodity prices and consumer prices
tend to diverge over time, commodity price levels and
consumer price inﬂation tend to move together over
time—that is, they are cointegrated (Boughton and
Branson 1991; Cody and Mills 1991).
• Commodities have signiﬁcant predictive power in
explaining short-run movements in CPI inﬂation,
even when researchers control for information con-
tained in monetary aggregates, real output, interest
rates, and exchange rates (Horrigan 1986; Webb
1988; Durand and Blondal 1991; Cody and Mills
1991; Garner 1989).
• The economic magnitude of these signals, however,
may be small (Horrigan 1986; Furlong 1989; Garner
1989).
• There is some evidence that these relationships have
shifted over time, with stronger linkages in the late
1970s and early 1980s than in the earlier period
(Whitt 1988; Furlong 1989).
Despite the empirical consensus, there are reasons
to believe that the commodity-CPI connection may have
weakened since the mid-1980s. First, with commodities
playing a smaller role in U.S. production, and in the
absence of major food and oil price shocks, recent commod-
ity price ﬂuctuations may not have been big enough to be
passed through to consumer prices. Second, the theoretical
literature on commodity prices suggests that the recent
attention of monetary authorities to commodity prices may
have diminished commodities’ signaling role.4 This would
occur if monetary authorities eased or tightened policy in
response to the inﬂationary signals of commodity prices
and thereby mitigated the actual inﬂation outcome. Third,
because commodity investments have yielded a poor return
in recent years, they have lost some appeal as inﬂation
hedges, making them less sensitive to inﬂation expecta-
tions. Finally, recent commodity movements may have lit-
tle to do with underlying inﬂation pressures and instead
may reﬂect a rebound in very depressed markets and the
impact of movements in dollar exchange rates.
Like the hare in Aesop’s famous fable,
commodity prices tend to take a quick, early
lead in inﬂation cycles, but ultimately lose
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TESTING COMMODITIES’ SIGNALING POWER
EIGHT COMMODITY PRICE INDICATORS
For our empirical tests, rather than focus on a single com-
modity index, we consider ﬁve popular alternative indexes
and three key subgroups of commodities. Each of the
indexes has advantages and disadvantages relating to the
properties of its construction and its correspondence to the
various commodity fables.
The most popular indicators in past empirical
research have been the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB)
spot index, the Journal of Commerce (JOC) index, and the
crude PPI:
• The CRB index is a simple, equally weighted average
of twenty-three commodities, including foodstuffs
and industrial materials. It is updated instantly on
computer screens and is the most closely watched
commodity index.
• The JOC focuses just on industrial commodities and
is therefore presumably well suited to capture the
tortoise-and-hare fable discussed above. It also has the
advantage of being speciﬁcally weighted according to
the inﬂation sensitivity of each of its components.
• The crude PPI is divided about evenly into three
parts: food, energy, and other. It is weighted accord-
ing to the actual value of commodity shipments and
therefore presumably is the best index for exploring
how commodity price increases are passed through to
ﬁnal goods prices.
In addition to these three traditional indexes, two
survey-based measures of commodity prices have recently
garnered attention—the NAPM and PHIL price indexes.
Both of these indexes measure the diffusion of price
increases across ﬁrms:
• The NAPM index measures the percentage of manu-
facturing ﬁrms reporting higher material prices, plus
half the percentage of those ﬁrms reporting no change
in prices. It therefore has a value of roughly 50 per-
cent when aggregate prices are unchanged.
• The PHIL index, calculated a bit differently, is the
percentage of ﬁrms in the Philadelphia region report-
ing higher prices, minus the percentage reporting
lower prices; hence, it should have a value of roughly
zero when aggregate prices are unchanged.
Historically, both of these diffusion indexes have proved to
be quite sensitive to conditions in commodity markets.
Three subgroups of commodities are also poten-
tially useful inﬂation predictors:
• Gold traditionally has been the commodity most
associated with inﬂation hedging.
• Food and oil have both been subject to major supply
disruptions and can be used to pinpoint the price
pass-through scenario.
IMPRESSIONISTIC EVIDENCE: TURNING POINTS
AND TRENDS
The simplest, least technical test of the inﬂation-signaling
power of commodity prices is to look at turning points in
the inﬂation cycle. The top panel of Chart 2 plots core CPI
inﬂation, with shading to indicate periods of falling inﬂa-
tion; the bottom panel plots inﬂation in the JOC index and
superimposes the shaded regions from the core CPI chart.
The chart illustrates why commodity prices gained popu-
larity as inﬂation indicators in the 1970s: from the late
1960s to the early 1980s, JOC inﬂation peaks and troughs
regularly predated peaks and troughs in core CPI inﬂation.
There were no missing signals over this period and there
was only one false signal: in 1976, JOC inﬂation peaked
and then declined, but CPI inﬂation continued to trend up.
Chart 2 also underscores why we suspect that com-
modity prices have not always been reliable indicators of
future inﬂation. During the 1960s and over the last decade,
the JOC index has been a poor leading indicator of turning
points in inﬂation, sending more false signals than correct
signals. For the most recent period, strong false signals
have occurred in 1987 and 1992. Even the correct signals
have been somewhat misleading, with very sharp commod-
During the 1960s and over the last decade, the
JOC index has been a poor leading indicator of
turning points in inﬂation, sending more false
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ity price surges preceding relatively mild inﬂation accelera-
tions. Similar results hold for the other major commodity
indexes. Thus, on a stand-alone basis, commodity price
indexes appear to be relatively unreliable indicators of
inﬂation in the recent period.
Another reason to suspect a breakdown in the
commodity-CPI connection is the steady drifting apart of
price levels. Chart 3 plots three stages of producer prices—
the crude, intermediate, and ﬁnished goods PPIs—along
with the core CPI since 1967. Note that each stage seems
to be relatively tightly linked until 1980. After that, each
index seems to drift apart, with the magnitude of the drift
increasing at each stage of fabrication. Although this drift
does not necessarily compromise the short-run commodity-



















Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics; Journal of Commerce.
Notes:  Each series is a three-month moving average of twelve-month percentage changes. The shaded areas denote periods of declining core CPI inflation.
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CPI relationship, it does make the arguments for a long-
run price pass-through more tenuous.
FORMAL TESTS: VARS
The impressionistic evidence suggests that the linkage may
have broken down; we now present more rigorous evidence
of a structural shift. We assess the overall performance of
the commodity indicators using conventional VARs, which
provide simple tests of the short-run causal relationship
between these variables. In addition to using conventional
VARs, we present in the appendix the results obtained by
using two alternative VAR models: error correction mod-
els, which test for long-run as well as short-run linkages;
and time-varying parameter models, which can be used to
explore shifts in the relationships among the variables
without having to divide the sample. These alternative
models generally conﬁrm the ﬁndings for the conventional
VARs.
For our VAR tests, we regress core CPI on lags of
itself and lags of a commodity index. Each equation also
includes a constant, a time trend, and the prime-age male
unemployment rate to control for business cycle impacts
on inﬂation. All variables included in the models are
appropriately differenced to ensure that the data are “sta-
tionary”; we also include twelve lags on each explanatory
variable.5 In addition to estimating our core CPI equations,
we test for a two-stage link between commodity prices and
core CPI inﬂation by ﬁrst estimating the relationship
between the commodity indexes and the ﬁnished goods
PPI and then testing the impact of the ﬁnished goods PPI
on core CPI inﬂation. This two-stage approach enables us
to explore the commodity-CPI connection in more detail.
The results for the full sample6—January 1970 to
April 1994—conﬁrm some ﬁndings in the literature. The
top panel of Table 1 shows tests of the joint statistical sig-
niﬁcance of twelve lags of the commodity indicators in pre-
dicting the change in core CPI inﬂation, as well as the sign
of the sum of the coefﬁcients. The bottom panel of the
table shows the results when ﬁnished goods PPI inﬂation is
the dependent variable. If the commodity indexes are use-
ful predictors of ﬁnal goods inﬂation, we would expect the
sum of the coefﬁcients to be positive and statistically signif-
icant (generally with p-values of less than .05). As in past
studies, the CRB and JOC indexes are signiﬁcant and have
the correct sign in explaining both the core CPI and the
ﬁnished goods PPI. Thus, they seem to provide information
beyond that contained in the model’s other variables.
Some of the full sample results, however, are sur-
Prices by Stage of Fabrication
Chart 3
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prising. The crude PPI is insigniﬁcant not only in the core
CPI equation, but in the ﬁnished goods PPI equation as
well. This result is particularly troubling for the price pass-
through view of the inﬂation process because the crude
PPI—more than any other commodity index—is weighted
to reﬂect the use of commodities in production. Our ﬁnd-
ing also contradicts studies such as Horrigan’s (1986),
which found that the crude PPI was signiﬁcant in explain-
ing the ﬁrst difference of CPI inﬂation for the 1959-84
period. The ﬁnished goods PPI does help explain core CPI
inﬂation, so there is only one weak link in the chain run-
ning from crude producer goods to ﬁnished producer goods
to consumer prices.
The results for the diffusion indexes—NAPM and
PHIL—also warrant some discussion since these indexes
have garnered considerable attention among business econ-
omists and ﬁnancial market analysts but have been largely
ignored in the academic literature. These indexes have
advantages and disadvantages relative to the JOC and CRB
indexes. On the plus side, they reﬂect the actual prices
companies pay for inputs—through long-term contracts
and auction markets—whereas the CRB and JOC indexes
include only auction prices. On the minus side, they are
based on qualitative surveys and are not released to the
public until weeks after the data are collected (by contrast,
the JOC and CRB indexes are immediately available).7
Thus, it is an empirical question whether the release of
these diffusion indexes each month adds any information
beyond that already reported in the market-based indexes.
The full-sample ﬁndings in Table 1 suggest that the aca-
demics have been right to ignore the diffusion indexes: nei-
ther is useful in predicting either core CPI inﬂation or
ﬁnished goods PPI. Indeed, in “horse races”—when the
diffusion indexes enter in the same regression as either the
JOC or CRB index—they are never signiﬁcant.
SPLIT SAMPLE RESULTS: A BREAK IN THE
COMMODITY-CPI CONNECTION
Table 1 also shows the results when we split the sample
into two parts: an early period (January 1970 to December
1986), which roughly covers the period tested in many
previous studies, and the more recent period (January 1987
to April 1994). Preliminary tests showed a signiﬁcant
structural break in these models in the mid-1980s, with
the qualitative results insensitive to the particular date
chosen.8The results for the earlier sample continue to sup-
port previous research: the sum of the coefﬁcients for the
commodity variables always has the correct sign and is
highly statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast to the full sam-
ple results and in conformity with Horrigan (1986), the
crude PPI is also signiﬁcant.
For the more recent period, the good news is that
all of the commodity indexes except CRB have a signiﬁcant
positive relationship to the ﬁnished goods PPI. Indeed, in
contrast to the full sample, the two diffusion indexes—
NAPM and PHIL—have a signiﬁcantly positive relation-
ship with the ﬁnished goods PPI. The bad news, and per-
haps this article’s key ﬁnding, is that except for the JOC
index, all of the commodity indexes have a perverse negative
relationship to core CPI inﬂation. Even the ﬁnished goods
PPI has developed a negative link, suggesting a breakdown
in the relationship between the inﬂation process in the
Sources:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Journal of Commerce, Commodity Research Bureau, National Association of Pur-
chasing Managers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Notes:  Table reports the sign and joint statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients
for each commodity index.  The explanatory variables in the regression include a
constant, a linear time trend, and one to twelve lags of:  the prime-age male
unemployment rate, the dependent variable, and a commodity index.  NAPM
and the unemployment rate enter as levels; PHIL enters as a difference; and the
CRB, JOC, crude PPI, and ﬁnished PPI enter as log differences.
Table 1
VAR TESTS OF COMMODITIES AS INFLATION PREDICTORS
Dependent Variable:  Change in Core CPI Inﬂation
1970-94 1970-86 1987-94
Commodity Indicator Sign P-Value Sign P-Value Sign P-Value
JOC (+) .01 (+) .01 (+) .06
CRB (+) .01 (+) .00 (-) .02
PPI crude (+) .32 (+) .06 (-) .04
NAPM (+) .20 (+) .00 (-) .03
PHIL (+) .52 (+) .04 (-) .01
PPI ﬁnished (+) .00 (+) .00 (-) .01
Dependent Variable:  Finished Goods PPI Inﬂation
1970-94 1970-86 1987-94
Commodity Indicator Sign P-Value Sign P-Value Sign P-Value
JOC (+) .00 (+) .00 (+) .00
CRB (+) .01 (+) .00 (+) .57
PPI crude (+) .61 (+) .00 (+) .07
NAPM (+) .24 (+) .00 (+) .00
PHIL (+) .23 (+) .03 (+) .0028 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1995
manufacturing sector and the overall economy. In other
words, for many indexes, an increase in commodity inﬂa-
tion has become associated with a future slowing in core
CPI inﬂation.9
OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTS
Although Table 1 suggests that commodity indexes have
failed to correctly signal movements in core CPI inﬂation
in the recent period, it tells us nothing about the magni-
tude of this signaling error. To get a sense of the size of this
error, we take the parameter estimates for the 1970-86
period for the CRB and JOC models and simulate the
models dynamically over the 1987-94 period (Chart 4).
The out-of-sample errors from this forecasting exercise
could reﬂect either shifts in the coefﬁcients for the com-
modity variables or shifts in other relationships in the
model. To pinpoint the impact of the weakened commod-
ity connection, therefore, the chart presents three simula-
tions: one excluding the commodity indexes, a second
including the CRB index, and a third including the JOC
index. The difference between the simulations with and
without the commodity indexes is used to measure the
additional error (or improvement) in the forecast due to the
commodity variable.
The simulations conﬁrm that these models have a
chronic tendency to overestimate the change in inﬂation in
the recent period. This overprediction is due in part to
misleading signals from the commodity indexes and in
part to a shift in other relationships in the model. Chart 4
plots a twelve-month moving sum of the monthly forecast
errors. It shows that the model without a commodity index
predicted an earlier and more virulent acceleration in inﬂa-
tion in the 1987-89 period than in fact occurred; the
model also suggested an uptick in inﬂation in 1994 rather
than the actual downtrend. When the CRB index is
included in the model, the overpredictions are even larger,
particularly for 1989 and 1994, and the average annual
error is about 1 percentage point over the entire 1987-94
period.
The results are more dramatic for the JOC index:
the model signiﬁcantly overpredicts over the entire period,
with annual errors of more than 2 percentage points in the
late 1980s and about 1 1/2 percentage points in 1994. This
poor performance is particularly troubling because this
index was designed speciﬁcally as an indicator of broad
inﬂation. Moreover, similar results are obtained when the
other commodity indexes are used, with an average annual
overprediction of about 1 percentage point.
ARE THE PARTS WORTH MORE THAN
THE WHOLE?
By lumping together a diverse group of commodities, the
indexes could obscure their components’ predictive power.
This would be the case if some commodities were not good
The bad news, and perhaps this article’s key
ﬁnding, is that except for the JOC index, all of
the commodity indexes have a perverse negative
relationship to core CPI inﬂation.
Chart 4
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Sources:  Authors  calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,





Notes:  The model for the acceleration in core CPI inflation is estimated
through December 1986 and then dynamically simulated forward. The
forecast prediction errors are reported as a twelve-month moving sum.
The sums for the first twelve months include both in-sample and
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inﬂation predictors or if the timing of the inﬂation signals
varied among different kinds of commodities.
To investigate these possibilities, we subject three
narrowly deﬁned commodities—gold, food, and oil—to
the same tests as the broader indexes (Table 2). Despite its
reputation as an inﬂation hedge, gold shows the weakest
results, sending unreliable signals for the full sample
period and both subsamples. Indeed, in the earlier period,
the sum of the coefﬁcients on gold is negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, suggesting that rising gold prices are a
signal of falling consumer price inﬂation.
By contrast, both oil and food—with positive, sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcients—appear to be good predictors of core
CPI inﬂation in the earlier period. This is consistent with
the idea that major supply disruptions in these markets fed
through to general inﬂation in the 1970s and early 1980s.
In the more recent period, both continue to have the cor-
rect sign. In the case of oil, this probably reﬂects the
impact of the 1990 supply shock to oil prices. As we will
explain later, one reason for this positive response may be
that monetary policymakers are more reluctant to tighten
when the commodity price rise is due to a supply shock
rather than a demand shock. Supply shocks pose a dilemma
for policymakers because inﬂation pressures increase at the
same time that real economic activity weakens. Hence,
supply-induced increases in commodity prices are more
likely to be allowed to show through to increases in ﬁnal
goods prices.
EXPLAINING THE DIMINISHED SIGNALING
POWER OF COMMODITIES
Commodity prices have clearly become a much less reliable
indicator in the recent period. In this section, we combine
impressionistic evidence, results from other research, and
our own empirical ﬁndings to support three explanations
for the shift:
• the diminished use of commodities as inﬂation
hedges,
• monetary policy reactions to commodity prices, and
• the shift away from commodity-intensive production.
In recent years, commodities have lost much of
their reputation as an effective tool for hedging inﬂation.
Over the postwar period, all three major commodity
indexes have failed to keep up with inﬂation and have been
particularly poor performers during the last twenty years
(Table 3). Some individual commodities have fared better
but have still fallen well short of safer investments, such as
Treasury bonds. For example, although gold prices have
matched the CPI for the 1975-94 period as a whole, they
have been a very volatile investment, skyrocketing in the
late 1970s, then dropping sharply, and ﬁnally hovering
around $400 per ounce for more than a decade. It is there-
fore not surprising that investors have generally rejected
commodities as an inﬂation hedge and instead are using
ﬁnancial futures on interest rates or exchange rates. For
Sources:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Journal of Commerce, Commodity Research Bureau.
Notes:  The dependent variable is the second difference of log core CPI. The table
reports the sign and joint statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients for each com-
modity index.  The explanatory variables in the regression include a constant, a
linear time trend, and one to twelve lags of:  the prime-age male unemployment
rate; the dependent variable; and the price index for either gold, food (a subcom-
ponent of the CRB), or oil (West Texas Intermediate posted price before 1982
and spot price thereafter). The unemployment rate enters as a level, gold enters as
a log difference, and oil and food enter as second log differences.
Table 2
THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF THREE COMMODITY SUBGROUPS
1970-94 1970-86 1987-94
Commodity Indicator Sign P-Value Sign P-Value Sign P-Value
Gold (-) .31 (-) .05 (-) .18
Food (+) .01 (+) .00 (+) .00
Oil (+) .05 (+) .01 (+) .02
Sources:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Journal of Commerce, Commodity Research Bureau, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Notes:  Each variable is deﬂated by the CPI.  The postwar sample starts in 1947,
except for JOC and CRB, which start in 1948 and 1967, respectively. Nonferrous
metals and food and feed are components of the crude producer price index, and oil
is the West Texas Intermediate posted price before 1982 and spot price thereafter.
Table 3
THE ANNUAL REAL RETURN TO COMMODITIES
Commodity Indicator Postwar 1975-94
JOC -2.4 -3.1
CRB -1.4 -3.0
PPI crude -1.2 -1.8
Gold 1.4 0.1
Nonferrous metals  0.0 -1.0
Food and feed -1.8 -2.8
Oil 1.1 -2.2
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instance, in 1993, trading in Treasury bond futures out-
numbered trading in gold futures more than ten to one
(Einhorn 1994). If gold and other commodities are not
seen as reliable inﬂation hedges, then less of their move-
ment will be due to changes in inﬂation expectations (and
a larger portion will be due to factors speciﬁc to commod-
ity markets).
A second explanation for the weaker predictive
power of commodities is that they may be an example of
Goodhart’s law. Goodhart argued that “any statistical regu-
larity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed on it for
control purposes.” Therefore, if investors believe that mon-
etary authorities are reacting to the inﬂation signals from
commodity prices, then the commodity price movements
will begin to reﬂect market expectations of monetary pol-
icy rather than independent information on the economy.
As an extreme example, Fuhrer and Moore (1992) show
that if the monetary authorities include commodities in
their “reaction function,” even “mild targeting pressure”
on commodity prices can lead to perverse results, with
increases in commodity prices predicting a decline in ﬁnal
goods prices. In this case, the signal of incipient inﬂation
pressures from commodities may be correct, but little
actual inﬂation occurs because of offsetting monetary pol-
icy. To continue our tortoise-and-hare analogy: the hare
sprints ahead, but the authorities cancel the race before it
heats up.
To test whether monetary policy may have offset
some inﬂation signals from commodity prices, we added a
variety of monetary policy measures to our VAR model for
the 1987-94 period. Table 4 shows the typical results
when M2 and the dollar are added: controlling for mone-
tary policy in this way causes the coefﬁcients to switch
signs from negative to positive for several commodity vari-
ables.10 This ﬁnding suggests that some of the weakening
in the commodity-inﬂation connection stems from policy
reaction.
As Chart 5 shows, however, adding M2 and the
dollar only partly solves the tendency of these models to
overpredict the acceleration in inﬂation in the recent
period. In particular, we repeat the out-of-sample exercise
reported earlier, estimating the JOC and CRB models over
the 1970-86 period and then simulating them over the
recent period. Adding M2 and the dollar to each model
does reduce the twelve-month sum of these out-of-sample
forecast errors by an average of about 0.2 percentage
points, but large overpredictions remain.11
These results complement the literature on the
“price puzzle.” Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994)
and others have pointed out that in a simple VAR frame-
work, money tends to have a perverse relationship to
aggregate prices—a tightening of policy raises the price
level. They also note that if a commodity indicator is added
to the model, the price puzzle tends to go away. Here we
have turned this puzzle around and have shown that in the
recent period, commodities have had a perverse link to
aggregate prices—higher commodity prices predict a
decline in ﬁnal goods prices—but the puzzle is partially
solved by including money in the model.
The ﬁnal—and probably most important—factor
in the diminished commodity-CPI connection is the sharp
decline in the commodity composition of U.S. output.
According to Rosine (1987), consumption of spot com-
modities as a share of nominal GDP ranged from 8 percent
to 10 percent from 1973 to 1981, but fell to just 4 percent
by 1986.12With the ongoing technological revolution, this
Sources:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Journal of Commerce, Commodity Research Bureau, National Association of Pur-
chasing Managers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Notes:  Table reports the sign and joint statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients for
each commodity index.  The explanatory variables in the regression include a con-
stant, a linear time trend, and one to twelve lags of:  M2, the trade-weighted dollar
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System measure), the prime-age male
unemployment rate, the dependent variable, and a commodity index.  NAPM and
the unemployment rate enter as levels; PHIL enters as a difference; and M2, the
dollar, CRB, JOC, crude PPI, and ﬁnished PPI enter as log differences.
Table 4
COMMODITY COEFFICIENTS WHEN MONEY AND THE DOLLAR
ARE ADDED TO THE 1987-94 MODEL
Core CPI Model Finished PPI Model
Commodity Indicator Sign P-Value Sign P-Value
JOC (+) .00 (+) .00
CRB (+) .00 (+) .00
PPI crude (+) .00 (+) .00
NAPM (-) .00 (+) .00
PHIL (-) .03 (-) .00
PPI ﬁnished (+) .00 NA NAFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1995 31
decline has presumably continued into the 1990s.
This diminished role seems to reﬂect a sharp
downward shift in demand for commodities that has low-
ered both the relative price of commodities and the growth
in quantity consumed. Final demand has moved steadily
away from goods with high commodity content (such as
food, textiles, and furniture) toward sectors with low com-
modity content (such as engineering products, electronics,
plastics, and services). For example, from 1948 to 1994,
the share of services in consumer spending almost doubled,
from 32 percent to 57 percent. Furthermore, although
commodity price inﬂation has exceeded CPI inﬂation for
brief periods, for the 1970-94 period as a whole, commodi-
ties have lost more than half their value relative to con-
sumer prices (Chart 6). This reduced role for commodities
means that they are a less reliable inﬂation signal, not only
because price pass-through effects are weakened, but
because as increasing parts of the economy become inde-
pendent of commodity markets, a rise in commodity prices
is more likely to reﬂect an increase in a narrow part of ﬁnal
demand than an increase in economy-wide demand.
WHY HAVE COMMODITY PRICES RISEN?
If commodities are not signaling major inﬂation pressures,
why have they risen so sharply?   In large part, two factors
seem to be at work. First, in many cases, prices have
rebounded from unusually depressed levels. As in most
cycles, the initial rebound in commodity prices may repre-
sent a catching-up process or a return to more normal
input demands rather than a signal of economy-wide
capacity pressures. As Chart 6 shows, even with their
recent rebound, commodity prices remain well below their
late 1980s peaks in real, CPI-adjusted terms.
Second, commodity prices may also have risen in
response to the weak dollar.   We would expect commodi-
ties—which are homogenous goods and are heavily traded
in international markets—to be subject to the law of one
price, that is, to have similar prices in each country’s home
currency. Thus, if the dollar weakens relative to other cur-
rencies, all else being equal, commodity consumers outside
the United States should be willing to pay more dollars for
The ﬁnal—and probably most important—
factor in the diminished commodity-CPI
connection is the sharp decline in the commodity
composition of U.S. output.
Chart 5
Percent
Notes:  The model for the acceleration in core CPI inflation is estimated
through December 1986 and then dynamically simulated forward. The
forecast prediction errors are reported as a twelve-month moving sum.
The average for the first twelve months includes both in-sample and
out-of-sample errors.
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commodity inputs, bidding up their dollar price.13 Chart 7
shows that commodity prices have been particularly sensi-
tive to dollar movements in recent years. For example, over
the 1971-86 period, the simple correlation between
twelve-month changes in the dollar and the JOC index was
only -0.02, but grew to -0.34 in the 1987-94 period.
CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the short- and long-run relation-
ships between commodity prices and consumer prices.
Using several VAR speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that most com-
modity indexes did have predictive power in explaining
consumer inﬂation in the 1970s and early 1980s. However,
we also present evidence that commodities have either lost
that power or, in some cases, are sending perversely nega-
tive signals.
What accounts for this poor performance? Com-
modities have declined in importance, both as a share of
ﬁnal output and as a source of exogenous shocks to the
economy. Some commodity price signals may also have
been offset by countervailing changes in monetary policy.
Furthermore, much of the recent commodity price run-up
should be seen as both a reaction to the dollar’s weakness
and a normal catch-up from very depressed levels.
These ﬁndings clearly pour some cold water on the
use of commodities as inﬂation signals in the recent period.
But could commodities regain their predictive power in
the future? There is little reason to expect a change in the
trend away from commodity-intensive production; com-
modities should continue to diminish in importance as a
measure of input prices and as an indicator of broad-based
strength in the economy. In other respects, however, their
signaling power may partially revive. Commodities should
remain an indicator of global excess demand. Thus, even if
they do poorly in predicting inﬂation in individual coun-
tries, they should retain some role as global inﬂation pre-
dictors. There are also signs of a partial revival in
commodity investments as inﬂation hedges: several new
commodity funds cropped up in the last year.
Nonetheless, in the absence of a major supply
shock, commodity prices should remain a secondary indi-
cator of future inﬂation. Inﬂation hawks might more prof-
itably focus on the unemployment rate and other indicators
for signs of future inﬂation.34 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1995
APPENDIX I: COMMON FORMS OF CORRELATION PRODUCTS
The conventional VAR methods reported in this article are
the most popular, but not the only, econometric methodol-
ogy used in the commodity literature. This appendix
brieﬂy reviews the results for two alternatives: (1) error cor-
rection VARs, which help us regain information on the
long-run relationships among the variables, and (2) time-
varying parameter VARs, which provide a more ﬂexible
test for shifts in the model relationships.
ERROR CORRECTION VARS
If two or more series have a cointegrating relationship—an
equilibrium relationship to which they gravitate over
time—then conventional VAR speciﬁcations ignore useful
information. Error correction VAR models can help us
regain information on these long-run relationships. In this
two-stage procedure, we ﬁrst estimate a cointegrating vec-
tor and we then add the lagged errors from this cointegrat-
ing regression—the error correction term—to the
conventional VAR model to explain the acceleration in CPI
inﬂation.
The stationarity tests reported in this article limit
the scope for cointegration. Two series can only be cointe-
grated at one degree of differencing less than the differenc-
ing needed to achieve stationarity. As a result:
• NAPM, which is stationary in levels, cannot be coin-
tegrated with the core CPI, and
• the other four commodity indexes and the core CPI
cannot be cointegrated at the same degree of differ-
encing because the commodity indexes are stationary
in ﬁrst differences, while the core CPI is stationary in
second differences.
Nonetheless, cointegration tests were run and revealed that
the levels of the JOC, CRB, and crude PPI indexes were
cointegrated with core CPI inﬂation, but only if the ﬁnished
goods PPI was also included in the cointegrating vector.14
These cointegration results present a dilemma for
the literature on the commodity–consumer price connec-
tion. Although the statistical results show a long-run link-
age between the level of commodity prices and the rate of
core CPI inﬂation, this relationship is difﬁcult to reconcile
with economic theory. For example, in a price pass-through
model, why would a onetime increase in the price of a com-
modity input cause a permanent increase in the rate of
growth in output prices? The puzzling nature of our ﬁnd-
ings prompted us to focus on the conventional VAR tests
of a short-run commodity-CPI linkage in this article.
With this important caveat in mind, we present in
the appendix table the error correction results for the three
DUMMY VARIABLE TESTS IN AN ERROR CORRECTION
VAR MODEL
Full Sample Dummy Variable
Sign P-Value Sign P-Value
CRB model
    Error correction (-) .01 (+) .72
    CPI (+) .00 (-) .00
    Finished PPI (+) .01 (-) .00
    CRB (+) .59 (-) .00
JOC model
    Error correction (-) .01 (-) .48
    CPI (-) .00 (-) .00
    Finished PPI (+) .17 (-) .10
    JOC (+) .34 (-) .33
Crude PPI model
    Error correction (-) .00 (+) .09
    CPI (-) .00 (-) .00
    Finished PPI (+) .00 (-) .00
    Crude PPI (-) .00 (+) .00
Sources:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Journal of Commerce, Commodity Research Bureau, National Association of Pur-
chasing Managers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Notes:  Table reports the sign and joint statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients
for the principal explanatory variables and the corresponding dummy variables.
The dummy variables are set equal to the explanatory variables for the 1987-94
period, and are zero otherwise.  The regression equation includes a constant, a lin-
ear time trend, the lagged errors from the cointegrating regression, and one to
twelve lags of:  the prime-age male unemployment rate, the dependent variable,
the ﬁnished PPI, and a commodity index.  NAPM and the unemployment rate
enter as levels; the CRB, JOC, crude PPI, and ﬁnished PPI enter as log differences.APPENDIX II: ANALYZING THE PRICE RISK OF A STANDARD INSTRUMENT:
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THE CONSTANT MATURITY TREASURY SWAP (Continued)
commodity models. The explanatory variables, including
the error correction term, are listed at the left. The ﬁrst two
columns show the sign and the joint statistical signiﬁcance
of the sum of the lagged coefﬁcients associated with each
variable. The last two columns continue our tests for a
structural shift in these relationships, showing the sign and
statistical signiﬁcance of dummy variables. These variables
take on a value equal to the explanatory variable for the
1987-94 period and are zero otherwise. The coefﬁcients for
the dummy variables show whether the relationship has
shifted in the more recent period, becoming either stronger
(positive coefﬁcient) or weaker. The formulation also allows
for a formal Chow test of whether the dummy variables are
jointly statistically different from zero.
The results from this more complicated model
generally support the VAR ﬁndings. In particular, the coef-
ﬁcients for the commodity price dummy variables provide
further evidence of a diminished short-run linkage between
commodities and core CPI inﬂation in the recent period.
The coefﬁcients on both the CRB and JOC dummy vari-
ables are negative; for the CRB index, the shift is highly
statistically signiﬁcant. Chow tests are highly signiﬁcant in
all three cases, conﬁrming a shift in the overall relation-
ships in the model.
TIME-VARYING PARAMETER ESTIMATION
Using dummy variables or splitting the sample does not
allow us to examine the evolution of the coefﬁcient esti-
mates. In this section of the appendix, we allow the coefﬁ-
cients associated with commodity prices to vary over time.
This methodology is useful because it enables us to exam-
ine when the relationship between commodity prices and
inﬂation appears strongest and when it appears weakest.
The time-varying technique uses initial conditions to esti-
mate coefﬁcients and updates the coefﬁcients under the
assumption that the parameters are persistent, that is, fol-
low a random-walk process. The econometrics involved
closely resemble those used in Doan, Litterman, and Sims
(1984) and are brieﬂy reviewed in Blomberg and Harris
(1995).
We estimate the time-varying model for all com-
modity indexes and obtain qualitatively similar results for
all indexes. Therefore, we report only those results for the
JOC because it has the longest history of our commodity
series. The appendix chart plots the twelve-month moving
average of the sum of coefﬁcients associated with the JOC
index. The results are generally consistent with our earlier
ﬁndings: the commodity coefﬁcients tend to increase in the
1970s but decline in the more recent period. The decline
appears modest because the estimation methodology only
gradually captures a structural shift; if the recent weaker
linkages continue, the time-varying coefﬁcients will con-
tinue to fall as well.
Sum of coefficients
Notes:  The chart is based on a regression of the second difference in the log
of core CPI on a constant, a linear time trend, the prime-age male unemploy-
ment rate, and one to twelve lags of the dependent variable and the log
change of the JOC index. All parameters are estimated assuming they follow ￿
a random-walk process. The sum of the coefficients on the JOC index is ￿
plotted as a twelve-month moving average to smooth out month-to-month
variations. The shaded area denotes the 1987-94 period.
The Changing Link between the JOC and the CPI








Sources:  Authors  calculations, based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Journal of Commerce.
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ENDNOTES
1. Indeed, these models predict that commodity prices will tend to
overshoot the mark in response to a money supply increase, rising above
their long-run equilibrium initially and then falling back to
equilibrium.
2. Even if commodity prices rise simultaneously with final goods prices,
the increase will first be observed in commodity indexes because they are
updated almost immediately, while consumer price indexes are reported
with a lag of several weeks.
3. For an excellent review of the literature, see Hilton (1990).
4. Starting in the late 1980s, several Federal Reserve Governors pointed
to a role for commodity prices in the conduct of policy. See, for example,
Angell (1987), Greenspan (1987), and Johnson (1988). Studies of the
Federal Reserve’s “reaction function” have found mixed evidence of a role
for commodity prices. Hakkio and Sellon (1994), for example, find that
commodity indexes are individually statistically significant in explaining
movements in the federal funds rate but do not add to the model’s overall
ability to predict the funds rate over the 1983-93 period.
5. If the data are not stationary—that is, if the underlying process that
generated the series changes over time—then classical tests are invalid.
Dickey-Fuller tests showed NAPM and the prime-age unemployment
rate to be stationary in levels; finished PPI, crude PPI, CRB, JOC, and
PHIL to be stationary in first differences; and the core CPI to be
stationary in second differences. We experimented with alternative lag
lengths. Akaike information criteria suggested that nine or twelve lags
were optimal for all our equations, with very little difference in the test
statistics. In keeping with the literature and to ensure that seasonal
effects were captured, we settled on twelve lags for all our tests. See
Blomberg and Harris (1995) for details of these tests.
6. Earlier data are available for some of our commodity indexes, but we
choose a uniform sample to make our tests comparable.
7. An additional disadvantage of the PHIL index as an indicator of
national inflation pressures is that it covers only a relatively narrow
geographic region.
8. In experimenting with alternative dates for splitting the sample, we
found a progressive deterioration in the commodity variable coefficients
as we moved through the 1980s. For example, although all of the
commodity price variables had the correct sign for the full sample, only
four of five were correct for the 1979-94 sample, only three were correct
for 1983-94, only two for 1985-94, only one for 1987-94, and none for
1989-94. We settled on the 1987 split not only to make comparisons
with previous research, but also to ensure an adequate number of
observations in each subsample.
9. In contrast to commodity prices, the prime-age male unemployment
rate remains a significant inflation predictor in all our equations,
regardless of the sample period.
10. Similar results were obtained using the federal funds rate as the
monetary indicator. For these equations, we also deleted the trade-
weighted dollar, but this change did not materially affect the results for
the monetary variables.
11. The simulation results are sensitive to how the unemployment rate
enters the model. Although it is logical to assume that the
unemployment rate is stationary, the Dickey-Fuller tests suggest that we
may want to enter it in first differences rather than in levels. In this case,
although the commodity models still tend to strongly overpredict the
change in CPI inflation during periods of high commodity inflation, the
forecast errors for the 1987-94 period as a whole have less of an upward
bias. In addition, by including the change in the unemployment rate, we
reverse our finding for M2: it no longer appears to improve the out-of-
sample forecast performance.
12. These figures understate total commodity consumption somewhat
because they include only purchases on spot markets.
13. A key assumption here is that the dollar movement is exogenous and
is causing the commodity price change. Alternatively, both the dollar
depreciation and the commodity price surge could reflect worsening
inflation expectations. It is hard to believe, however, that the relatively
modest inflation cycles of recent years could play much of a role in the
period’s dramatic exchange rate movements. It seems more plausible to
argue that swings in investor sentiment are driving the dollar, which in
turn is influencing commodity prices.
14. See Blomberg and Harris (1995) for formal test results.
S. Brock Blomberg, formerly an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
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